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1
1 Introduction
The concept of an efficient portfolio and its empirical performance constitute one of the
central issues in financial market theory. Starting with the work of Markowitz (1952) and
Tobin (1958), economists have investigated portfolios which, given a certain expected
return, minimize the risk of future wealth fluctuations. Based on this portfolio theory,
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) developed the famous Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM). One of the fundamental conclusions from the model is that the
structure of a mean-variance efficient portfolio is exactly that of the so-called market
portfolio and that the relation between the expected returns of an asset and the return
of this market portfolio is linear.
The notion of efficiency used in the CAPM is an ex-ante concept of an optimal trade-off
between expected return and expected variance conditional on available information. It
is assumed that the perceived probability distribution of agents is correct and stationary
implying that repeated investment decisions that are based on the same beliefs will follow
the same principles. Transposed to a dynamic context, this concept of efficiency suggests
that any sequence of actual returns associated to efficient portfolios will statistically
prove to be superior to any other non-efficient portfolio.
A major caveat of the CAPM, however, is its central assumption that all investors have
homogeneous self-fulfilling expectations on future returns. This rules out heterogeneous
expectations and the possibility of false beliefs including their effects on portfolio de-
cisions. In fact, its static nature leaves unexplained why different agents may hold
portfolios that differ considerably from the proposed market portfolio. For a meaning-
ful investigation of efficiency, the static CAPM has therefore to be extended to a fully
dynamic setting.
Based on Bo¨hm, Deutscher & Wenzelburger (2000), Bo¨hm & Chiarella (2000) and Brock
& Hommes (1998), Wenzelburger (2001) introduced the concept of a reference portfolio
in a dynamic version of the CAPM with heterogeneous beliefs. The reference portfolio
may be seen as a ‘modified’ market portfolio that accounts for discrepancies due to
incorrect beliefs. A generalization of the famous security market line result is then
established stating that regardless of the diversity of beliefs, the portfolios of investors
that are collinear to the reference portfolio are mean-variance efficient in the classical
sense. It is shown that portfolios of investors with linear mean-variance preferences
and rational expectations are mean-variance efficient. The prerequisite for this result is
the notion of a perfect forecasting rule for first and second moments in the presence of
non-rational beliefs of other market participants. These forecasting rules provide correct
first and second moments of the price process conditional on the available information,
and in this sense they generate orbits with rational expectations.
Contrary to these findings, in many models like the Santa Fe artifical stock market
(LeBaron, Arthur & Palmer 1999) or in those of Brock & Hommes (1997a, 1998) and
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Chiarella & He (2002) various forms of chartism are applied according to their profitabil-
ity. It is argued that professional traders use technical trading rules (Taylor & Allen
1992), because they are profitable, e.g., see Brock, Lakonishok & LeBaron (1992) or Lo,
Mamaysky & Wang (2000). However, in the context of a dynamic CAPM with rational
investors and heterogeneous beliefs matters may change. Economic folklore suggests
that only mean-variance efficient portfolios of rational investors will survive in the long
run.
Since in a dynamic context trading of assets takes place before observing actual return,
it is clear that the the empirical performance of a portfolio over time has to rely on
estimators for the statistical features of the returns associated to that portfolio. In par-
ticular, the superiority of efficient portfolios in the sense of CAPM will only show, if
the involved estimators for the (conditional) moments are consistent. For inconsistent
estimators, portfolios other than the efficient portfolio may appear to perform better.
On the other hand, taking into account how subjective expectations determine market
clearing asset prices in a sequential asset market (e.g., see Bo¨hm, Deutscher & Wenzel-
burger 2000), a sequence of returns induced by beliefs has a priori no direct link to the
perceived subjective efficiency of a portfolio.
This paper now investigates properties of efficient portfolios under heterogeneous be-
liefs. We analyze the question to what extent boundedly rational consumers are able to
identify professional brokers (called mediators) who hold mean-variance efficient port-
folios. It is shown that there is no direct relationship between the ex-ante efficiency
and the empirical performance of such portfolios. Taking empirical Sharpe ratios as
a performance measure, noise traders or chartists may outperform investors that hold
mean-variance efficient portfolios. These findings reveal that based on empirical ob-
servations, mediators with mean-variance efficient portfolios may not be identified. In
particular, empirical Sharpe ratios might be inaccurate estimators for the slope of the
efficiency frontier.
3
2 The model
Following Bo¨hm & Chiarella (2000) and Wenzelburger (2001), consider an overlapping
generations model with a finite number of types h = 1, . . . , H of young households.
Each young household of type h lives for two periods, receives an initial endowment
e(h) > 0 of a non-storable commodity only when young. In order to transfer wealth
to the second period of his life, such a consumer will choose a portfolio of K + 1 ∈ N
retradeable assets whose proceeds he will consume. There is one risk-free real asset
which has an exogenously given constant real rate of return R = 1 + r > 0. The other
K assets correspond to shares of firms whose production activities induce a stochastic
process of dividends which are distributed to the shareholders.
Young consumers (households) are characterized by linear mean-variance preferences as
in Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958). They have no direct access to a stock market
and instead select a financial mediator who manages their portfolios. There is a finite
number i = 0, . . . , I of fund managers/financial mediators characterized by subjective
probability distributions regarding the future cum-dividend price of the assets. We
assume that each mediator i = 0, . . . , I selects a probability distribution from a fixed
family of subjective distributions parameterized by the first two moments conditional
on the available information, i.e., the subjective conditional mean values and subjective
conditional (variance-) covariance matrices for future cum-dividend prices.
Let t be an arbitrary trading period and q
(i)
t and V
(i)
t denote mediator i’s subjective
mean value and subjective covariance matrix of the future cum-dividend price vector
qt+1 = pt+1 + dt+1 ∈ R
K
+ . Assume that the dividend payments dt ∈ D are randomly
drawn from some subset D ⊂ RK+ and let pt denote the corresponding ex-dividend price
vector. Let η
(hi)
t ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of households of type h employing mediator
i in period t, where
∑I
i=0 η
(hi)
t = 1. Then W
(i)
t =
∑H
h=1 η
(hi)
t e
(h) is the amount of
resources of mediator i received from young households in that period. Her earnings
from dividend and interest payments from the portfolio of risky assets x
(i)
t−1 ∈ R
K and
risk-free assets y
(i)
t−1 ∈ R obtained after trading in period t− 1 are d
>
t x
(i)
t−1 + ry
(i)
t−1. Since
aggregate repayment obligations to old households are (p+dt)
>x
(i)
t−1 +Ry
(i)
t−1, her budget
constraint in period t reads W
(i)
t = p
>x(i) + y(i). Then based on the belief (q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t ),
the aggregate demand function for risky assets of all households which employ i is
(1) x(i) = a
(i)
t V
(i)−1
t [q
(i)
t − Rp], p ∈ R
K
+ ,
where a
(i)
t :=
∑H
h=1
η
(hi)
t
α(h)
denotes the risk-adjusted fractions of households employing
mediator i and α(h) measures risk aversion of household h.
Let x¯ ∈ RK+ denote the total amount of retradeable risky assets in the economy which
must be equal to the sum of previous positions
∑I
i=0 x
(i)
t−1. Given a list of arbitrary beliefs
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(q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t )
I
i=0 one immediately obtains an explicit functional form of the ex-dividend price
pt from the market-clearing condition, given by
(2) pt = S
(
(a
(i)
t , q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t )
I
i=0
)
:=
1
R
(
I∑
i=0
A
(i)
t q
(i)
t − Atx¯
)
with
(3) At :=
(
I∑
i=0
a
(i)
t V
(i)−1
t
)−1
and A
(i)
t := a
(i)
t AtV
(i)−1, i = 0, . . . , I.
Assuming that all covariance matrices are positive definite, At is well defined, symmetric,
and itself positive definite. The map (2) is an economic law with an expectations
feedback in the sense of Bo¨hm & Wenzelburger (1999, 2002, 2003).
The decision of a household is based on the performance of a mediator. Having invested
the amount W
(i)
t =
∑H
h=1 η
(hi)
t e
(h), mediator i’s return from selling the portfolio x
(i)
t :=
a
(i)
t V
(i)−1
t [q
(i)
t −Rpt] in period t+ 1 is
(4) R
(i)
t+1 = r +
a
(i)
t
W
(i)
t
[qt+1 −Rpt]
>V
(i)−1
t [q
(i)
t − Rpt].
The behavior of households is modeled using a Logit model, e.g., see Anderson, de
Palma & Thisse (1992). For each i, the sample means µˆ
(i)
t and the sample standard
deviations σˆ
(i)
t of the time series {R
(i)
s }ts=0 are recursively given by
(5)
µˆ
(i)
t :=
1
t+1
∑t
s=0R
(i)
s = 1t+1 [R
(i)
t + tµˆ
(i)
t−1],
σˆ
(i)
t :=
[
1
t+1
∑t
s=0(R
(i)
s − µˆ
(i)
s )2
] 1
2
=
[
(R
(i)
t
−µˆ
(i)
t
)2
t+1
+ t
t+1
σˆ
(i) 2
t−1
] 1
2
,
where µˆ
(i)
−1 ≥ 0 and σˆ
(i)
−1 ≥ 0. Using (5), an estimator for the Sharpe ratio associated
with the realized returns (4) of mediator i is given by (µˆ
(i)
t −r)/σˆ
(i)
t . The fraction η
(hj)
t of
households of type h which employs a particular mediator j in period t is now assumed
to be determined by the discrete-choice probability
(6) η
(hj)
t :=
exp
(
β(h) (µˆ
(j)
t−1 − r)/σˆ
(j)
t−1
)
∑I
i=0 exp
(
β(h) (µˆ
(i)
t−1 − r)/σˆ
(i)
t−1
) , t > 0,
with arbitrary η
(hj)
0 ≥ 0,
∑I
i=0 η
(hi)
0 = 1. The parameter β
(h) appearing in the discrete
choice model (6) describes the intensity of choice of a household of type h, that is, how
fast a typical consumer of type h will switch to a different mediator.
To obtain the evolution of the asset prices, we need to specify the probabilistic assump-
tions on the the exogenous dividend process.
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Assumption 2.1 Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and {Ft}t∈N an increasing fam-
ily of sub-σ-algebras of F . The dividend payments are described by a {Ft}t∈N-adapted
stochastic process {dt}t∈N on (Ω,F ,P) with values in R
K. Moreover, each covariance-
variance matrix Vt[dt+1] ≡ Vd, t ∈ N is constant over time, with Vd positive definite.
Given the price law (2) for ex-dividend prices and Assumption 2.1 for the dividend
process, the cum-dividend price in period t is
(7) qt = S
(
(a
(i)
t , q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t )
I
i=0
)
+ dt, t ∈ N.
Since pt defined by (2) is Ft−1 measurable, the conditional mean values and the con-
ditional covariance matrices of the cum-dividend price, i.e., its first two conditional
moments, are
(8)
Et−1[qt] = Et−1
[
S
(
at, q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t )
I
i=0
)]
+ Et−1[dt]
= 1
R
[∑I
i=1A
(i)
t q
(i)
t + A
(0)
t q
(0)
t − Atx¯
]
+ Et−1[dt],
and
(9) Vt−1[qt] = Vt−1[dt] = Vd,
respectively. This reveals that the uncertainty in cum-dividend prices and in the traded
quantities of assets rests solely on the dividend process.1
3 Perfect forecasting rules for moments
Suppose that a boundedly rational mediator 0 (also referred to as fundamentalist) seeks
efficient reference portfolios in the sense of Sec. 4. Given the context of mean-variance
preferences, it then suffices to analyze the case in which mediator 0 is able to correctly
predict the first two moments of the price process conditional on all available informa-
tion, whereas other market participants may have non-rational beliefs. As a short hand,
we will use the term rational expectations to describe the situation in which the first
two moments of mediator 0’s subjective distributions, i.e., the conditional mean values
and the conditional covariance matrices, coincide with the respective moments of the
true distributions.
To investigate the existence of forecasting rules that correctly predict the first moments
of cum-dividend prices, consider the case with two mediators, say mediator 0 and medi-
ator 1, and assume without loss of generality that a
(0)
t > 0 for all times t ∈ N throughout
1The underlying OLG structure is not essential for this paper. Hillebrand (2003) shows that the
price process (7) is structurally the same when consumers have a multi-period planning horizon. This
holds true also for consumers with infinite lives who maximize wealth myopically as in Brock & Hommes
(1997a, 1998), Kirman (1998) and Chiarella & He (2002).
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this section.2 Suppose that mediator 1 is a noise trader in the sense of De Long, Shleifer,
Summers & Waldmann (1990, p. 709) whose cum dividend forecast q
(1)
t deviates from
the cum-dividend forecast q
(0)
t by some randomly drawn perturbation t, such that
q
(1)
t = q
(0)
t + t.
Using (8), the condition that the conditional forecast errors of the cum-dividend prices
for mediator 0 vanishes is
(10) Et−1[qt]− q
(0)
t−1 = Et−1
[
S
(
(a
(i)
t , q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t )
I
i=0
)]
+ Et−1[dt]− q
(0)
t−1 = 0
for all times t. Inserting the second expression in (8) into (10) and solving for q
(0)
t , yields
an explicit expression for the new forecast q
(0)
t , given by
(11)
q
(0)
t = ψ
(0)
(
t,Et−1[dt], (a
(i)
t , q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t )
I
i=0, q
(0)
t−1
)
:= (A
(0)
t + A
(1)
t )
−1
[
R
(
q
(0)
t−1 − Et−1[dt]
)
− A
(1)
t t −
∑I
i=2A
(i)
t q
(i)
t + Atx¯
]
.
Notice that the inverse (A
(0)
t + A
(1)
t )
−1 is well defined, because A
(0)
t is positive definite
and A
(1)
t is positive semi-definite. The function (11) is therefore well-defined as well
and may now be interpreted as a forecasting rule for cum-dividend prices of mediator 0,
because it defines a functional relationship between the actual forecast q
(0)
t and historical
data. The forecasting rule (11) provides unbiased forecasts for cum-dividend prices for
mediator 0 in the sense that (10) is satisfied and will henceforth be referred to as unbiased
forecasting rule or, simultaneously, as perfect forecasting rule for first moments.
By (9), the second moments of the price process are independent of any expectations
and equal to the covariance matrix of the dividend process. Thus, perfect forecasting
rules for second moments which correctly predict second moments of the prices process
always exist. For mediator 0, such a forecasting rule takes the form
(12) V
(0)
t = Vd for all t ∈ N.
It is shown in Wenzelburger (2001) that mediator 0 has to know the excess demand
function of all market participants and thus their investment behavior in order to apply
the unbiased forecasting rule (11). The main informational constraint for applying the
forecasting rule (11) is the fact that neither the fraction of households joining a partic-
ular mediator nor the beliefs of the mediators are observable quantities. Wenzelburger
(2001) shows how this missing information can successfully be retrieved from a suitable
estimation of the excess demand function.
2This can always be guaranteed by setting η
(h′0)
0 > 0 and β
h
′
= 0 for some household h′ in the
discrete choice model (6).
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4 Risk premia
Recall that the households’ investment decisions are based on the performance of me-
diators. Following Wenzelburger (2001), we introduce the reference portfolio of period
t ∈ N by
(13) xreft = Vt[qt+1]
−1[Et[qt+1]− Rpt],
noting that by Assumption 2.1 (i) and (9), the conditional covariance matrix Vt[qt+1]
is positive definite and hence invertible. The reference portfolio xreft is fictitious in the
sense that it is not necessarily traded in the market. If r = R−1 is the risk-free interest
rate, then the return of the portfolio (13) in period t+ 1 after investing one unit of the
consumption good in period t is
(14) Rreft+1 = r + [qt+1 − Rpt]
>xreft .
The conditional variance of Rreft+1 is Vt[R
ref
t+1] = x
ref>
t Vt[qt+1]x
ref
t . Combined with (13),
this shows that the conditional risk premium of the reference portfolio satisfies
(15) Et[R
ref
t+1]− r = [Et[qt+1]−Rpt]
>
Vt[qt+1]
−1[Et[qt+1]−Rpt] = Vt[R
ref
t+1]
and for this reason is always non-negative. On the contrary, the conditional risk premium
of a mediator may, in general, well be negative.
The security market line result Theorem 3.1 in Wenzelburger (2001) states that the risk
premium Et[R
(i)
t+1]−r of any mediator i can only be higher than the risk premium of the
reference portfolio (13) at the expense of higher risk, i.e. Vt[R
(i)
t+1] ≥ Vt[R
ref
t+1]. Moreover,
taking Sharpe ratios conditional on information at date t, it is shown that
(16)
Et[R
(i)
t+1]− r√
Vt[R
(i)
t+1]
≤
Et[R
ref
t+1]− r√
Vt[R
ref
t+1]
=
√
Vt[R
ref
t+1] for all times t.
Using (4) and (14), the Sharpe ratios (16) of mediator i’s returns take the form
(17)
Et[R
(i)
t+1]− r√
Vt[R
(i)
t+1]
=
[Et[qt+1]− Rpt]
>x
(i)
t√
x
(i)>
t Vt[qt+1]x
(i)
t
.
In view of (1), any mediator i who is able to correctly predict the first two conditional
moments of the price process at date t will hold the scalar fraction a
(i)
t of the reference
portfolio, i.e., x
(i)
t = a
(i)
t x
ref
t . As a consequence, (16) implies that this mediator will
always obtain the highest Sharpe ratio and hence hold mean-variance efficient portfo-
lios in the sense of classical CAPM. Portfolios of non-rational investors will always be
inefficient.
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To compare the performance of a portfolio of fundamentalist, who is able to correctly
predict the first two moments of the price process, with the performance of that of a
noise trader, notice first that their realized returns (4) depend crucially on differences
in beliefs. This is seen as follows. Let IK denote the K × K identity matrix. Using
IK =
∑I
i=0 A
(i)
t for all times t and (1) , the portfolio x
(j)
t of risky assets of mediator j
after trading in period t takes the form
(18) x
(j)
t = a
(j)
t V
(j)−1
t At x¯ +
I∑
i=0
a
(j)
t V
(j)−1
t A
(i)
t [q
(j)
t − q
(i)
t ].
In the special case of homogeneous beliefs on first and second moments, we have
(19) x
(j)
t =
a
(j)
t
a
x¯ with a =
H∑
h=1
1
α(h)
.
Then all mediators hold fractions of the market portfolio x¯, where the fractions are
determined by the risk-adjusted group sizes, i.e., the (risk-adjusted) market shares. In
view of (4), the differences in the respective returns are then exclusively determined by
the market shares.
To facilitate further investigations, assume from now on that both mediators are able
to correctly predict the conditional second moments of the cum-dividend price process.
This implies that the subjective covariance matrices of the fundamentalist (mediator 0)
and the noise trader (mediator 1) coincide and are correct such that for each t ∈ N,
(20) V
(0)
t = V
(1)
t = Vd.
Using (4) and the reference portfolio (13), the excess return of the fundamentalist be-
comes
(21) R
(0)
t+1 − r =
a
(0)
t
W
(0)
t
[qt+1 − Rpt]
>xreft .
It follows from (15) that the risk premium of the fundamentalist is always positive, that
is, E[R
(0)
t+1]−r > 0. Analogously, since q
(1)
t = q
(0)
t + t, the excess return of a noise trader
becomes
(22) R
(1)
t+1 − r =
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
[qt+1 −Rpt]
>[xreft + V
−1
d t].
Taking conditional expectations, it follows from (13) and (15) that
(23) Et[R
(1)
t+1 − R
(0)
t+1] =
(
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
−
a
(0)
t
W
(0)
t
)
Vt[R
ref
t+1] +
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
>t x
ref
t .
This shows that the risk-adjusted group sizes weighted by the invested amount of re-
sources, i.e.,
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
and
a
(0)
t
W
(0)
t
together with the correlation between the reference portfolio
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xreft and the error term t have a key influence on whether or not the risk premia of a
noise trader are higher than the risk premia of a fundamentalist.
In the special case of only one type of household, i.e. H = 1, the first effect cancels out.
It is straightforward to see that the ratios
a
(i)
t
W
(i)
t
, i = 0, . . . , I are constant over time, such
that
a
(i)
t
W
(i)
t
= 1
α(1)e(1)
, i = 0, . . . , I
for all times t. The following proposition follows directly from the law of iterated
expectations.
Proposition 4.1 Assume that there exists only one type of household, i.e., H = 1.
Then
E[R
(1)
t+1]− r = E[R
(0)
t+1]− r +
1
α(1)e(1)
E[>t x
ref
t ].
Moreover,
E[R
(1)
t+1] ≥ E[R
(0)
t+1] if and only if E[
>
t x
ref
t ] ≥ 0.
Unfortunately, an analytical comparison of the respective (unconditional) variances
V[R
(1)
t+1] and V[R
(0)
t+1] does not give as much insight as for the first moments. Never-
theless we collected some results in Appendix A.1.
5 The performance of efficient portfolios
In many models like the Santa Fe artifical stock market (LeBaron, Arthur & Palmer
1999) or in those of Brock & Hommes (1997a, 1998) and Chiarella & He (2002) various
forms of chartism are investigated. This is justified by the observation that professional
traders use technical trading rules (Taylor & Allen 1992), because they are profitable,
e.g., see Brock, Lakonishok & LeBaron (1992) or Lo, Mamaysky & Wang (2000). How-
ever, given the availability of perfect forecasting rules for first and second moments,
matters change. Since with these forecasting rules efficient portfolios can actually be
traded, economic folklore suggests that these portfolios will eventually attract all cap-
ital and outperform all other investment strategies. Hence, only portfolios of rational
mediators will survive in the long run. In a scenario in which households are allowed to
select mediators, one is tempted to hypothesize that eventually all or at least the vast
majority of agents will hold efficient portfolios.
However, as the examples of the next two sections show, there exist robust situations in
which non-rational mediators remain in the market while their portfolios perform better
than the efficient one. Thus, it is by no means guaranteed that the principle ‘choose the
best performer’ achieves its intended goal. From a CAPM perspective such a finding
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appears to be counter intuitive and in fact is opposite to the results obtained in Bo¨hm
& Chiarella (2000) for homogeneous groups.
The present section reinforces results obtained by Tonn (2001) who showed that in the
CAPM case with two fixed groups of noise traders and fundamentalists empirical Sharpe
ratios of noise traders may be higher than those of fundamentalists and, in fact, that
the returns of mean-variance efficient portfolios may on average be lower than those of
noise traders, while at the same time, the empirical standard deviation is higher.
5.1 Fundamentalists versus noise traders
Consider the case of two mediators i = 0, 1 in K financial markets. Assume that
mediator 0 has rational expectations on cum-dividend prices and that mediator 1 is
a noise trader as discussed above (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann 1990, p.
709). In this case I = 1 and A
(0)
t +A
(1)
t = IK . Suppose furthermore that the subjective
covariance matrices of both mediator 0 and 1 coincide and are correct, such that (20)
holds for all t ∈ N. Setting a =
∑H
h=1
1
α(h)
for the aggregate risk tolerance, this implies
(24) At =
1
a
Vd with a =
I∑
i=0
a
(i)
t
for all times t ∈ N. The resulting cum-dividend price process is then given by a set of
random difference equations
(25)


qt = q
(0)
t−1 − Et−1[dt] + dt,
q
(1)
t = q
(0)
t + t,
q
(0)
t = R
(
q
(0)
t−1 − Et−1[dt]
)
−
a
(1)
t
a
t +
1
a
Vd x¯,
where the last equation is the unbiased forecasting rule corresponding to (11). The
system of equations (25) is a nonlinear random difference equation in expected prices
with additive noise which has nonlinearity induced by the risk-adjusted market share
a
(1)
t . Since the ex-dividend price is pt = q
(0)
t−1 − Et−1[dt], it is straightforward to verify
that the reference portfolio (13) takes the form
xreft =
1
a
[
x¯− a
(1)
t V
−1
d t
]
.
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4.1, we obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 5.1 Assume that there exists only one type of household, i.e., H = 1. Then
E[R
(1)
t+1] ≥ E[R
(0)
t+1] if and only if E[t]
>x¯ ≥ E
[
a
(1)
t 
>
t V
−1
d t
]
.
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Let us call a noise trader optimistic if E[t] >> 0 and pessimistic if −E[t] >> 0 . Then
Corollary 5.1 implies that the average return of a sufficiently optimistic noise trader is
higher than the average return of a fundamentalist, whereas the average return of a pes-
simistic noise trader will never be higher than the average return of the fundamentalist.
The long-run behavior of the random dynamical system, i.e., equations (25) together
with the discrete choice model (6) is described by random attractors which is the random
analogue of an attractor of a deterministic system (see Arnold 1998, p. 483). Each orbit
starting from the corresponding domain of attraction will then eventually end up on such
an attractor. Typical candidates for these special orbits are generated by asymptotically
stable random fixed points. A random fixed point may be seen as a special solution to the
difference equation (25) that induces a stationary and ergodic process. Loosely speaking,
asymptotic stability of a random fixed point means that for almost all perturbations
ω ∈ Ω, all orbits starting from sufficiently close initial conditions eventually converge to
orbits of the random fixed point.
The ergodicity property of an asymptotically stable random fixed point implies in par-
ticular that the sample means and the sample standard deviations given in (5) converge
almost surely to the mean value and the standard deviation of the stationary distribution
associated to the random fixed point. In case of such a random fixed point we therefore
expect the empirical Sharpe ratios to converge almost surely to constant values. This
implies that the market shares given by the group sizes (6) as well will almost surely
converge to constant values. As a consequence, the long-run behavior of the system (25)
is then governed by a stochastic system which is asymptotically linear.
To gain a first insight into the behavior of (25), consider the case in which the switching
process has settled down to a situation with constant market shares, that is, a
(1)
t ≡ a
(1)
for all times t. In this case the system (25) is an affine (linear) random difference equation
for which a unique random fixed point exists. In classical terminology, a random fixed
point of (25) then corresponds to a ‘steady state solution’ of a linear stochastic system
as given in Hannan & Deistler (1988, Chap. 1). For (25) this process takes the form
(26) q
(0)
?t :=
∞∑
s=0
Rs
[
1
a
Vd x¯− Et−1−(s+1)[dt−(s+1)]
)
−
a(1)
a
t−(s+1)
]
.
If R < 1, the random fixed point is globally asymptotically stable implying that all
orbits will eventually converge to orbits of the stationary process (26), see Bo¨hm &
Chiarella (2000). If R > 1, then the random fixed point is unstable and the resulting
process is explosive.
While in the linear case, it is analytically tractable to verify the existence of an asymptot-
ically stable fixed point, the situation is considerably more complicated in the nonlinear
case. Since the general existence results (Schmalfuß 1998, 1996) are difficult to apply,
we rely on numerical experiments in order to obtain some qualitative properties.
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Consider the situation with two risky assets (K = 2) such that the system (25) has a
2-dimensional state space. The forecast errors {t = (
(1)
t , 
(2)
t )}t∈N are governed by iid
processes with symmetric triangular density functions, parameterized by a list
(
(k)
min, 
(k)
max, c
(k)), k = 1, 2,
where −
(k)
min = 
(k)
max = 0.325 and the c
(k) describe the modes of the densities, respectively
(see Appendix A.2).
For all numerical experiments, the safe rate of return is kept fixed and set to R = 0.99
while the dividend payments in both markets follow uncorrelated AR(1) processes (see
Appendix A.2). In addition, the switching parameters for H = 3 households will be set
to the same level, i.e. β(h) = β, h = 1, 2, 3, and noise parameters will be set to the same
level, i.e. c(k) = c, k = 1, 2. This assumption facilitates the numerical investigation of
the role of the noise parameter c and the switching parameter β, where by construction
no household will switch between mediators for β = 0. Finally, initial market shares are
equal, i.e., η
(0)
t = η
(1)
t = 1/2
Figure 1 about here.
Figure 1 shows for each asset a relatively fast convergence of three different cum-dividend
price paths to a joint price path. Here, we have set c = 0.1625 and β = 2.5 for a
relatively low switching intensity. All three price paths are simulated using the same
path of realizations ω1 ∈ Ω of the exogenous noise process. Numerical experiments
indicate that this convergence seems to be independent of initial forecasts (and other
initial conditions such as price levels). Moreover, a convergence to a joint path seems
to take place for every other randomly drawn path ω ∈ Ω of the noise process. For this
reason, these observations are interpreted as numerical evidence for an asymptotically
stable random fixed point.
Figure 2 about here.
Figure 2 (a) exhibits a time series of asymptotically constant market shares, confirming
that the system (25) is asymptotically linear, whereas Figure 2 (b) show the realized
returns of the fundamentalist (mediator 0) and the noise trader (mediator 1), respec-
tively. These findings suggest that the limiting behavior of the system (25) is governed
by a stationary and ergodic process generated by a random fixed point. Moreover, no-
tice that Figure 2 (a) displays a situation in which the noise trader outperforms the
fundamentalist, because η
(0)
t < 0.5 for large t, even though none of the mediators will
leave the market, because the market share η
(0)
t stays well between 0 and 0.5. Figure 2
(b) provides evidence for the intuition that the additional random fluctuations of noise
traders are absorbed in the return process of the fundamentalist.
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Observe that c ≥ 0 (c < 0) implies that the noise trader chooses a more optimistic
(more pessimistic) price forecast than the (unbiased) one of the fundamentalist. Figure
3 provides numerical evidence that a noise trader may outperform the fundamentalist,
if the noise trader is sufficiently optimistic. Leaving all other parameters at their levels
fixed above, we vary c ∈ [−0.325, 0.325] and β ∈ [0, 10] as in a two-parameter bifurcation
diagram. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the system (25) becomes asymptotically
linear for each parameter constellation, because the market shares settle down to con-
stant values. We conclude from this observation that limiting behavior is stationary and
ergodic.
Figure 3 about here.
Figure 3 portrays the market share of the fundamentalist η
(0)
T after T = 1000 periods.
Using two different randomly chosen noise paths ω1 and ω2, which are kept fixed for each
panel, several features may be observed. First, the blue and purple regions in panels
(a) and (b) show parameter combinations for which, depending on the noise path, the
noise trader will outperform the fundamentalist. On the contrary, the green, yellow and
light red regions indicate parameter values for which the fundamentalist outperforms
the noise trader. In this region the two mediators have non-zero market shares and
remain in the market.
Second, high switching intensities β may induce market shares η
(0)
T close to zero as
indicated by the deep red purple coloring in Figure 3. In these parameter regions the
fundamentalist die out and only noise traders survive. On the other hand, noise traders
have zero market shares in the regions of vermillion red.
Third, the sharp vertical contour breaks indicate that there is a strong sensitivity of
the limiting behavior on the mode c and therefore on the noise process. The contour
lines suggest the presence of coexisting attractors with associated basins of attraction
for these parameter values.
These findings show that the portfolio of a noise trader may outperform those of a fun-
damentalist, in spite of the fact that the fundamentalist maintains the efficient portfolio.
Since the market shares are a monotone transformation of the empirical Sharpe ratios,
the empirical Sharpe ratios of noise traders may be higher than the empirical Sharpe
ratios of fundamentalists. This demonstrates that a particular choice behavior may not
be able to identify an efficient mediator.
The bifurcation diagrams have to be interpreted with care. The underlying presumption
is that the long-run behavior is generated by a random fixed point such that the system
is asymptotically stationary and ergodic. This presumption was verified by numerical
experiments, however, no analytical result is yet available. Apart from the patience of
households and the optimism of the noise traders, the long-run behavior of the economy
seems to depend strongly on the chosen noise path. See our website www.wiwi.uni-
bielefeld.de/vboehm for more simulation results.
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5.2 Fundamentalists, noise traders, and chartists
In the second example, a so-called chartist is added to the other two mediators: mediator
0 with rational expectations on cum-dividend prices and mediator 1 who is a noise
trader. Although we will not treat this case in the same full length of Section 5.1, similar
phenomena will be observed with the advantage that there exist an asymptotically stable
random fixed point for R > 1.
Let mediator 2 be a chartist who uses the simple technical trading rule
(27) q
(2)
t = ψ
(1)(qt−1, . . . , qt−L) :=
L∑
l=1
D(l) qt−l
as a forecasting rule, where D(l) = diag(δ
(l)
1 , . . . , δ
(l)
K ), l = 1, . . . , L are diagonal matrices
whose non-zero entries denote the expected weighted trends of the asset prices, respec-
tively. Thus, mediator 2 behaves like a trend trader in K ≥ 1 risky assets. As before,
assume that all subjective covariance matrices coincide and are correct, such that for
each t ∈ N, V
(i)
t = Vd, i = 1, 2, 3, and hence, as before,
(28) At =
(
H∑
h=1
1
α(h)
)−1
Vd, t ∈ N.
The resulting cum-dividend price process is given by a set of random difference equations
(29)


qt = q
(0)
t−1 − Et−1[dt] + dt,
q
(2)
t =
∑L
l=1 D
(l)qt−l,
q
(1)
t = q
(0)
t + t,
q
(0)
t = R
(
1 +
a
(2)
t
a
(0)
t
+a
(1)
t
) (
q
(0)
t−1 − Et−1[dt]
)
−
a
(1)
t
a
(0)
t
+a
(1)
t
t
−
a
(2)
t
a
(0)
t
+a
(1)
t
∑L
l=1 D
(l)qt−l +
1
a
(0)
t
+a
(1)
t
Vd x¯,
where the last equation corresponds to the unbiased forecasting rule (11). Together with
the discrete choice model (6), these equations describe the evolution of cum-dividend
prices. To gain some insight into the behavior of (29), let us first discuss the case in
which the switching process has settled down to a situation with constant market shares.
In this case Proposition 5.2 establishes conditions under which an asymptotically stable
random fixed point obtains.
Proposition 5.2 Assume that the following hypotheses are satisfied.
(i) The group sizes a
(i)
t ≡ a
(i) > 0, i = 0, 1, 2 are constant over time.
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(ii) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ K be arbitrary but fixed. Assume that all zeros of the characteristic
polynomial χk, k = 1, . . . , K associated with (29), given by
χk(λ) = λ
L+1 − R
(
1 + a
(2)
a(0)+a(1)
)
λL + a
(2)
a(0)+a(1)
L∑
l=1
δ
(l)
k λ
L−l,
lie inside the unit circle.
Then the price process for the k-th asset admits a globally asymptotically stable random
fixed point.
The proof of Proposition 5.2 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.2 in Wenzelburger
(2001). Under the hypotheses of Proposition 5.2, the existence of globally asymptotically
stable random fixed point implies that with probability one all solutions to the equation
(29) will eventually behave like the stationary stochastic process induced by that random
fixed point.
For all numerical experiments, we consider two risky assets (K = 2) and a risk-free rate
of return set to R = 1.01, while as before, the dividend payments in both markets follow
uncorrelated AR(1) processes. The forecast errors {t = (
(1)
t , 
(2)
t )}t∈N are governed by
iid processes with a triangular distribution with −
(k)
min = 
(k)
max = 0.325 and c
(k) = c,
k = 1, 2. To facilitate numerical investigations, the switching parameters for H = 3
households are again set to the same level, i.e. β(h) = β, h = 1, 2, 3. Moreover the length
of the chartist’s memory is L = 2 with δ(1) = δ(2) = 0.65 and the initial market shares
are η
(0)
0 = η
(1)
0 = η
(2)
0 = 1/3.
Figure 4 displays two parameter bifurcation diagrams with c ∈ [−0.325, 0.325] and
β ∈ [0, 2] corresponding to the same two randomly drawn noise paths of Section 5.1.
As before, these are kept fixed for each panel, respectively. Monto Carlo simulations
indicate that for each parameter combination, a random fixed point exists such that the
long-run behavior is stable. The panels of each of the figures portray the market shares
of fundamentalists and noise traders after T = 1000 periods. The panels display a rich
variety of possible outcomes for which all mediators coexist in the long run while the
chartist may achieve a surprisingly high market share. Moreover, the contour lines are
predominantly a horizontally oriented indicating that the parameter c has less influence
than the switching intensity β.
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6 Conclusions
The paper provided a first simulation analysis of the empirical performance of portfo-
lios in a competitive financial market with heterogeneous investors. For such markets,
the generalization of the security market line result (Wenzelburger 2001) states that
the portfolios of investors with mean-variance preferences and rational expectations
are efficient in the ex-ante sense of classical CAPM theory. It was shown that these
mean-variance efficient portfolios may fail to empirically outperform other (inefficient)
portfolios. Taking empirical Sharpe ratios as a performance measure, noise traders or
chartists may appear to perform better than investors holding mean-variance efficient
portfolios. These findings reveal that mean-variance efficient mediators may not be iden-
tified. They provide some evidence that empirical performance measures of portfolios
in an environment with heterogeneous beliefs may be misleading.
A Appendix
A.1 Comparison of variances
Let us now turn to the variances of the respective returns. Since
V[R
(1)
t+1] = V[R
(0)
t+1] + Cov[R
(1)
t+1 +R
(0)
t+1 , R
(1)
t+1 − R
(0)
t+1],
we have
(30) V[R
(1)
t+1] ≤ V[R
(0)
t+1],
if and only if
Cov[R
(1)
t+1 +R
(0)
t+1 , R
(1)
t+1 − R
(0)
t+1] = Cov[R
(1)
t+1 +R
(0)
t+1 − 2r , R
(1)
t+1 −R
(0)
t+1] ≤ 0.
Using the definition of the covariance, (30) holds, if and only if
(31) E
[
(R
(1)
t+1 +R
(0)
t+1 − 2r)(R
(1)
t+1 − R
(0)
t+1)
]
≤ E
[
R
(1)
t+1 +R
(0)
t+1 − 2r
]
E
[
R
(1)
t+1 −R
(0)
t+1
]
.
To see whether or not (31) can be satisfied, notice that (21) and (22) imply
R
(1)
t+1 +R
(0)
t+1 − 2r =
(
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
+
a
(0)
t
W
(0)
t
)
[qt+1 −Rpt]
>xreft +
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
[qt+1 − Rpt]
>V
−1
d t.
Taking conditional expectations, it follows from (13) and (15) that
(32) Et[R
(1)
t+1 +R
(0)
t+1 − 2r] =
(
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
+
a
(0)
t
W
(0)
t
)
Vt[R
ref
t+1] +
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
>t x
ref
t .
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Clearly, (32) is positive whenever (23) is positive. In this case, taking (unconditional)
expectations, the r.h.s. of (31) is positive. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4.1, this
observation holds true, whenever E[>t x
ref
t ] ≥ 0.
The positivity of the r.h.s. of (31) is an important prerequisite for (31) to be satisfied.
Considering the l.h.s. of (31), the following observation can be made. First, we calculate
(R
(1)
t+1 +R
(0)
t+1 − 2r) (R
(1)
t+1 − R
(0)
t+1)
=
([
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
]2
−
[
a
(0)
t
W
(0)
t
]2)(
[qt+1 − Rpt]
>xreft
)2
+2
[
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
]2 (
[qt+1 − Rpt]
>xreft
) (
[qt+1 −Rpt]
>
V
−1
d t
)
+
[
a
(1)
t
W
(1)
t
]2 (
[qt+1 −Rpt]
>V
−1
d t
)2
.
Taking expectations, we see that the l.h.s. of (31) may indeed be small enough such that
equation (31) may be satisfied.
A.2 Simulation of the exogenous noise
This appendix collects most of the information relevant for the simulation results.
Assumption A.1 The dividend payments for the K = 2 assets are described by an
AR(1) process dt = Bdt−1 + ξt, where B = diag(0.76, 0.76) and {ξt = (ξ
(1)
t , ξ
(2)
t )}t∈N
is an iid process with each ξ
(k)
t , k = 1, 2 uniformly distributed on the compact interval
[0, 0.024]. Each covariance-variance matrix satisfies
Vt[dt+1] = V[ξt] = diag(0.000048, 0.000048), t ∈ N.
Assumption A.2 Forecast errors of noise traders {t = (
(1)
t , 
(2)
t )}t∈N follow an iid
process. For each asset k = 1, 2, the respective distribution function is a triangular
distribution (Evans, Hastings & Peacock 1993, S. 149f), given by the density function
fk(z
(k)) =


2(z(k)−
(k)
min
)
(
(k)
max−
(k)
min
)(c(k)−
(k)
min
)
∀ 
(k)
min ≤ z
(k) ≤ c(k)
2(
(k)
max−z
(k))
(
(k)
max−
(k)
min
)(
(k)
max−c(k))
∀ c(k) ≤ z(k) ≤ 
(k)
max,
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Figure 1: Random fixed point: β = 2.5, c = 0.1625.
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Figure 2: Market shares and returns, c = 0.1625 and β = 2.5
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Figure 4: Market shares after T = 1000 periods.
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